Casual empiricism suggests that deceptive advertising is prevalent, and several classes of theories explore its causes and consequences. We provide some unusually sharp empirical evidence on the extent, mechanics, and dynamics of deceptive advertising. Ski resorts self-report 23 percent more snowfall on weekends; there is no such weekend effect in government precipitation data.
"Jackson Hole/Teton Village DID NOT get 15" today…more like 0" -Skier comment posted on SkiReport.com, 3/15/2009 Casual empiricism suggests that deceptive advertising is prevalent, and several classes of theories explore its causes and consequences. Yet there is little sharp empirical evidence that speaks to such theories. This gap is due in part to formidable measurement challenges; in most settings, measuring deceptive advertising requires detailed, highfrequency information (on ads, product quality, and inventories) that is difficult to observe.
We test for deceptive advertising by examining a critical component of product quality at ski resorts: new natural snowfall in the past 24 hours. Ski resorts issue "snow reports" on their websites roughly once a day. These reports are also collected by aggregators and then rebroadcast over the Internet and via print and broadcast media. A skier wishing to ski on fresh snow can use these snow reports to help decide whether and where to ski on a particular day.
The dynamics of customer acquisition by ski resorts suggest that the optimal (deceptive) advertising strategy may vary at high frequencies. Resorts only benefit from exaggerating snow reports when skiers condition purchase decisions on them. The cost of exaggeration is angering or losing credibility with skiers, including those who have already pre-committed (e.g., as part of a multi-day vacation) but use the snow report to help plan their day. The pre-committed should represent a larger share of (potential) skiers on weekdays than on weekends, when many skiers are less constrained by work schedules and (we hypothesize) more likely to condition resort choice on snow conditions. So if there is deceptive advertising we should expect to see more of it designed to attract weekend skiers.
We test that hypothesis using data from [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , and find that resorts do indeed report 23 percent more fresh snow on Saturday and Sunday mornings (1.54 inches vs.
1.24 inches, p-value = 0.013). We match resort reports with government weather data and find that there is no such weekend effect in actual snowfall.
Having found that deceptive advertising varies within resorts along with payoffs, we next explore whether deceptive advertising varies across resorts with plausibly different payoffs. Weekend effects in snow reporting are larger for resorts with more expert terrain and those within driving distance of population centers. This is consistent with expert skiers valuing fresh snow more highly and with resorts near cities having more potential to attract weekend skiers. We do not find any significant interactions between the density of competition and weekend effects.
How can exaggerated claims about product quality persist in equilibrium? Many theories show that deceptive advertising can prevail when consumer search or switching costs are high. These costs are likely high in our setting. On a one-shot basis, driving times are substantial even between "neighboring" resorts. On a longer-term basis, some consumers may find it costly to coordinate with peers on alternative destinations or to learn how to navigate the terrain and ancillary services (parking, rentals, dining, lodging) of a new mountain.
Our setting seems most closely characterized by models where firms take advantage of high search costs by "baiting" consumers with a high quality good that is not actually in stock, and then "switching" consumers to a lower quality good that is available (Lazear 1995) . But our results relate to several other classes of models as well. In signal-jamming models (e.g., Holmstrom 1999) , agents engage in costly effort to upwardly bias signals of their quality, but rational recipients of these signals anticipate these efforts and no information is lost. In settings with search or information costs, "obfuscation might lead to higher profits by making consumer learning less complete" (Ellison and Ellison, forthcoming) .
1 Other theoretical models focus on deception, with motivating examples that relate to advertising (Kartik et al. 2007 ; Ettinger and Jehiel forthcoming).
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The hypothesis that search and information costs drive deceptive advertising is supported by a final finding from our setting: ski resorts stop exaggerating fresh snowfall after a technology shock dramatically reduces the cost of rapid information sharing between customers. In January 2009, SkiReport.com added a new feature to its popular iPhone application that makes it easier for skiers to post "first-hand reports" alongside the resort-provided reports. This feature sparked a sharp increase in the amount and timeliness of skier feedback on the accuracy of resort reports, with many first-hand reports filed from the chairlift or the lodge. But first-hand reports spike only at resorts with adequate coverage from AT&T's data network, and these covered resorts experience a disproportionate post-launch drop in exaggeration. This finding adds to the body of existing evidence that the Internet can reduce market frictions, at least for a time. 3 It also complements work showing that third-party interventions to improve quality disclosure can change firm behavior. 4 See, e.g., Sauer and Leffler (1990) ; Melnick and Alm (2002) ; Jin and Leslie (2003) ; Greenstone et al (2006) .
Although our findings provide unusually sharp evidence on the nature and dynamics of deceptive advertising, 5 our setup can only identify a subset of the behaviors of interest for modeling and policy analysis. We lack any data related to the resort profit functions, and hence cannot directly measure how skiers respond to snow reports. 6 This prevents us from sharply testing across the models discussed above, identifying whether consumers pierce the veil of firm deception, or measuring the welfare implications of (changes in) advertising practices.
Moreover, the external validity of our findings to other markets is uncertain.
Nevertheless we argue that our findings have potentially broad applicability, as the market for skiers does not seem uniquely suited to deceptively advertising. There are many other markets where search and switching costs loom large. And many of the other conditions that contribute to deception in theory do not seem to prevail in our setting. Ski area customers get immediate and visceral feedback on the accuracy of snow reports. The potential for repeat play and learning is high. 7 And the exit rate of ski areas is low: there are few if any "fly-by-night" players with incentives to commit outright fraud. So we 5 The closest study to ours we are aware of is Jin and Kato (2006) , who audit claims about the quality of baseball cards being auctioned on eBay and find evidence of exaggeration. Jin and Kato's analysis focuses on the effect of deceptive claims on demand and auction prices, whereas our focus is on the supply of deception. Also related to our work is a small empirical literature following Gabaix and Laibson (2006) examines hidden or distorted prices; see, e.g., Brown et al (2007) , Stango and Zinman (2009) . Bertrand et al (forthcoming) explores the role of persuasive advertising that is not deceptive per se. There is also a substantial literature examining third-party forecasts or assessments of product quality that may be biased by commercial relationships: earnings forecasts (Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999) , product recommendations (Reuter and Zitzewitz 2006) , and sports judging (Zitzewitz 2006; Price et al. 2009 ). 6 We conducted this study without industry cooperation, and hence our data on resorts is limited to what we could gather from websites. Nearly all resorts are privately held so publicly financial information on them is scarce, particularly at the daily frequency. 7 The immediate feedback stands in contrast to the examples (e.g., tobacco use, investment advice) that motivate Glaeser and Ujelyi (2006) and Kartik et al (2007) . The visceral feedback (and high stakes) contrasts with the "low involvement situations" (e.g,. voting, cheap products) that can make consumers susceptible to persuasion in Mullainathan et al (2008) .
speculate that there are many other markets where conditions are ripe for deceptive advertising that varies sharply with advertiser incentives.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses our data. Section III details our identification strategy and results. Section IV concludes.
II. Data
Our data consist of resort-provided snow reports, government snow data, and resort characteristics.
We collect resort-provided reports from the websites of two popular aggregators: we are limited to collecting data for days on which the relevant web page was archived.
We collect snow reports from archived pages that summarize all reports from a given state or province, so generally an entire state's data is either available or unavailable on a given day. The frequency of data collection in these archives increases over time. While it seems reasonable to assume that the archiving process in these Internet-wide archives was exogenous to actual or reported snow, we conduct three tests. First, we test whether reports were more likely to be archived on certain days of the week, and find that weekends account for almost exactly two sevenths of our resort reports (28.4%, p-value of difference with 2/7 = 0.945). Second, we simply examine the timing of the reports, finding that in one of our archives it increased from once every ten days, to once every five days, to once every three days, to essentially every day. Archiving frequencies were higher for states with more resorts (e.g., Colorado vs. South Dakota), suggesting that archiving responded to webpage popularity, but the regular sampling frequencies suggested that this response was not happening at high enough frequency to contribute to a weekend effect. Third, we test below whether the availability of a report is correlated with an interaction of government-reported snow and a weekend indicator variable, and find no evidence that it is.
We compare the resort reports of new snowfall to government data from two sources:
actual reported snowfall from nearby government weather stations, and estimated snowfall from the Snow Data Assimilation System (SNODAS), a U.S. National Weather
Service model that provides estimated snowfall from satellite, ground station, and airborne weather data collection. 8 SNODAS data are available for any point in the continental United States on a 30-arc-second grid.
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We take the highest of the 25 SNODAS estimates from the 5x5 grid surrounding the main resort mountain as the estimate of actual snowfall that we match to the resort snow report.
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For the government weather stations, we match each resort with to up to 20 National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) or National Operational
Hydrologic Remote Sensing Center (NOHRSC) weather stations within 25 miles horizontally and at elevations within 500 feet of the resort summit. 11 We match each resort snow report to mean reported snow from the surrounding stations that meet these criteria.
In matching the resort and government snow data, we match time periods as closely as possible. Resorts can issue and update snow reports on aggregator websites at any time, but they usually issue a report early in the morning local time. 12 This report is timed to capture as much overnight snowfall as possible while still being available in time to affect that day's skier purchasing decisions. Saturday's snow report issued at 7 AM local time would therefore reflect snowfall from 7 AM Friday to 7 AM Saturday, and so we attempt to match the Saturday resort report with SNODAS and government data from this time period. NOHRSC reports typically cover a 24-hour period beginning at 7 AM local time, so this matches the timing of resort reports well. NOAA stations aggregate their data into 24-hour periods beginning at midnight Coordinated Universal To capture resort proximity to skiers who might be most influenced by snow reports in deciding whether and where to make a day-or weekend-trip, we calculate the population that lives in zip codes within 150 miles (as the crow flies) of the resort using U.S. census data. We also count the number of non-co-owned resorts within 50 miles as an indication of potential competition. Eastern resorts are closer to population centers and have more neighboring competitors. Resorts report more snow than is reported in government weather data on both weekdays and weekends, although this could be the result of resort being located on specific mountains that receive more snow than neighboring locations. 13 There is also more snow on weekends in government weather data, but the differences are smaller (and, as we will see below, are statistically insignificant).
III. Results
In this section, we test for a weekend effect in snow reports, examine the cross-sectional determinants of the weekend effect, and examine how the weekend effect changed with 13 While the SNODAS model estimates snowfall for precise locations, it does so partly by interpolating between government weather stations. Thus strategic ski resort location decisions might exploit mountainby-mountain variation in snowfall that SNODAS does not fully capture.
the introduction of an iPhone application that made it easier for skiers to post first-hand reports on snow conditions.
Our main specification for testing for weekend effects is:
s rt = b*w t + a w + n r + e rt (1) where s rt is snowfall reported by resort r on day t, w t is an indicator variable for whether t is a weekend day, a w is a fixed effect for a specific calendar week (Wednesday-Tuesday), n r is a fixed effect for a resort, and e rt is an error term. The fixed effects control for any bias arising from the proportion of snow reports on weekends varying between more and less snowy weeks of the year (e.g., if resorts were open only on weekends at the beginning and end of the season) or between more and less snowy resorts. Point estimates actually change very little when these fixed effects are dropped (Table A1) , so this potential omitted variable bias does not appear important in practice. That said, the fixed effects do improve the efficiency of estimation, by absorbing variation that would otherwise be captured by the error term.
14 Since actual and reported snowfall may be correlated across resorts on the same day, we allow for clustering within day when calculating our standard errors. Since snow reports may be serially correlated, we also allow for clustering within resorts, using the two-dimensional clustering procedure in Petersen (2009) . Allowing for clustering within days does meaningfully affect standard errors, while clustering within resort has essentially no effect.
14 We also experimented with specifications that included resort*week fixed effects. Unfortunately we lose about a third of our degrees of freedom in this specification, causing a rise in standard errors. While this rise in standard errors causes our estimated weekend effect to lose statistical significance, the point estimate is not statistically (or economically) significantly different from the specifications in Table 3 (pvalue 0.66), and the additional fixed effects are not collectively significant. See Table A1 for details. there is a weekend effect in snowfall in general. 15 In all cases we find no statistically significant evidence of a weekend effect in government snowfall data. We do find a positive point estimate, however, and will therefore control for government snowfall data in most of the analysis where resort-reported snowfall is the dependent variable. Table 4 examines the effect of controlling for government weather data on our estimated weekend effects. Adding a control for government snowfall data significantly improves the efficiency of estimation and has only a small effect on the point estimate.
The first lead and lag of weather-station-reported snowfall are also correlated with resortreported snow, although adding these controls does not substantially change the size of 15 There is a small literature in climatology examining whether day of week effects in pollution affect precipitation and temperature. Cerveney and Balling (1998) find higher CO and O3 levels and higher precipitation on Fridays and Saturdays in areas downwind of the U.S. Eastern seacoast. Forster and Solomon (2003) find that nighttime low temperatures are 0.2 to 0.4 degrees Celsius higher on weekends in the middle of the United States but are 0.1 to 0.2 degrees lower in the Southeast and Southwest (weekend effects in the Northeast and West are smaller). Since the combined effect of these precipitation and temperature effects is uncertain, we test for weekend effects in snowfall in government data and include controls for government snow data in most of the regressions that follow.
the weekend effect. The second and longer leads and lags do not have statistically significant coefficients.
Controlling for SNODAS estimates of snowfall yields similar results. The point estimate of the weekend effect declines, but the efficiency of estimation improves. As with the government weather stations, correlations of resort reports with one lead and one lag of government data are statistically significant. We use the specifications in columns 4 and 7 of Table 4 , which include either controls for weather station or SNODAS estimates of snow on days t-1, t, and t+1, as our preferred specifications for subsequent analysis. Table 5 examines whether a selective-reporting bias affects our results. Selective reporting could be due to (possibly also deceptive) practices by resorts or aggregators that are subtly different than reporting more snow than has actually fallen. For example, resorts with no new snow might prefer to leave up a stale report rather than report no new snow, and the optimality of this strategy might vary over the week. Similarly, aggregators might condition whether to update the report on actual snowfall and the time of the week.
In practice we find some weak evidence that reporting frequencies are higher when there is more actual snow, but no evidence that reporting is more or less selective on weekends. Table 6 repeats the tests for a weekend effect on subsamples of the data. We use the specifications from columns 1, 4, and 7 of Table 4 , which include no controls for actual snow, controls for weather station snow data from days t-1 to t+1, and controls for SNODAS estimates of snow on days t-1 to t+1, respectively. Our estimates of a weekend effect vary slightly during our sample period, although we cannot reject the hypothesis that the weekend effect is constant. The weekend effect is large early in the ski season and in January and March, and is essentially zero during the Christmas holidays and during April and May. These results are consistent with skier decisions being more sensitive to snowfall early in the season, with purchase decisions being made in advance during holiday periods, and with skiers being less sensitive to new snow during the "spring conditions" portion of the season. We find roughly equally sized weekend effects in the U.S. and Canada, and larger (albeit not statistically significantly) weekend effects in the West. We also find larger weekend effects among resorts that do not offer moneyback guarantees and among publicly traded resorts and smaller weekend effects among government-owned resorts, although our estimates of the differences are imprecise, and even the economically large differences are statistically significant. The first result could be due to resorts with expert terrain being especially well located, but the latter result suggests that these resorts exaggerate their snowfall more on weekends since fresh snow is especially appealing to expert skiers. We also find larger weekend effects for resorts with a larger population within driving distance. In contrast, we find little relationship between weekend effects and the number 16 We also experimented with specifications that interacted the share of terrain that was Intermediate, Advanced, and Expert with the weekend indicator (with Beginner terrain as the omitted category). These regressions find slightly positive but insignificant coefficients for Intermediate and Advanced terrain and a positive and significant coefficient for Expert terrain. A regression including an indicator variable for any Expert terrain and a continuous variable for the share of Expert terrain suggests that the weekend effect is mostly associated with the former. This is consistent with resorts needing Expert terrain to be in experts' choice sets, but with the exact amount being less important (or imprecisely measured).
of neighboring competing resorts. 17 Likewise, the differences in weekend effect between resorts with different types of owners (publicly traded, private, or government) and between those that do and do not offer money guarantees mentioned above are not statistically significant.
Finally, we examine the effect of a change to the information environment on exaggeration. On January 8, 2009, SkiReport.com introduced a feature in its popular iPhone application that allows users to file "first-hand" reports. These reports are then posted below the resort's official snow report (Figure 3 ). Although users previously had the ability to file first-hand reports on the SkiReport.com website, the iPhone application made it much easier to do so from the phone (as opposed to a computer), and hence in real time (e.g., from the chair lift). The volume of first-hand reports increased dramatically following the feature launch, with the increase largely confined to ski resorts with adequate data coverage from the AT&T network (the sole network provider for the iPhone in the United States).
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In Table 8 , we estimate weekend effects for the 2004-8 seasons, for the 2008-9 season pre and post-feature launch, and then estimate the additional impact of the feature launch on the weekend effect for resorts most affected by the iPhone. 19 We find evidence of a weekend effect in the first half of 2008-9, but that the weekend effect declined sharply 17 In the regressions in Table 7 , we define two resorts as competitors if they are within 50 miles (as the crow flies), are not under common ownership, and either both or neither have expert terrain. We experimented with alternative definitions on all three dimensions but found no evidence of a relationship between weekend effects and competition. 18 The mere threat of negative first-hand feedback might be sufficient to deter exaggeration in equilibrium, and there are also many actual reports questioning the veracity of resort reports. There are many positive reports as well, and many others about issues unrelated to snow (e.g., food, socializing opportunities). We will provide some descriptive statistics in a subsequent draft. 19 In the current draft, we infer iPhone data coverage from the number of iPhone reviews, classifying resorts as "covered" if they received 10 or more iPhone reviews after January 8, 2009. We are working on developing a direct measure of coverage to avoid the possible endogeneity issues with our current approach.
after January 8, and that the decline was especially large for resorts most affected by the iPhone.
IV. Conclusion
We provide some unusually sharp empirical evidence on the extent, mechanics, and dynamics of deceptive advertising.
Ski resorts self-report 23 percent more snowfall on weekends; there is no such weekend effect in government precipitation data. Resorts that reap greater benefits from exaggerating do it more. We find little evidence that competition restrains or encourages exaggeration. Near the end of our sample period, we observe a shock to the information environment: a new iPhone application feature makes it easier for skiers to comment on resort ski conditions in real time. Exaggeration falls sharply, and much more at resorts with better iPhone reception. In all, the results suggest that deceptive advertising varies sharply with incentives, both within resorts (over time, at high-frequencies), and across resorts.
Although our setting may be unusual with its high-frequency variation in product quality, we speculate that our findings are broadly applicable. They relate to many classes of models on signaling, deception, obfuscation, and search costs. Search and information costs loom large in many other markets where product availability and pricing vary at high frequencies. Some of these markets presumably have conditions that are even more ripe for deceptive advertising than ours, with, for example, purchase decisions that are lower-stakes, quality realizations with longer lags, or fewer opportunities for repeat play and learning.
A particularly important direction for future research is to combine evidence on the nature and dynamics of deceptive advertising with evidence on consumer responses. This is critical for examining whether and how consumers pierce the veil of deception, and for measuring the welfare effects of deceptive advertising and innovations that amplify or discourage it. States and provinces that are entirely east of the Continental Divide are considered Eastern. Estimation is via OLS regressions that include fixed effects for weeks (Wed-Tues) and resort. Standard errors allow for clustering within both day and resort. Estimation is via OLS regressions that include fixed effects for weeks (Wed-Tues) and controls for SNODAS snow. Standard errors allow for clustering within both day and resort. Two resorts are considered competitors if they are within 50 miles, are not under common ownership, and either both or neither have expert terrain. Other reviews
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